Disruptive innovation: what it is, real (and false) examples and how to apply it

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Disruptive innovation is often used loosely to praise any big or novel change, but Clayton Christensen’s original theory is more precise. A true disruptive innovation begins by serving non-consumers or customers that incumbents consider unattractive—those who are overserved or priced out. The new entrant offers a simpler, more accessible, or cheaper solution that initially seems inferior on traditional metrics. Over time it improves its performance, reaches mainstream demands, and can displace established leaders. The distinguishing features are the entry point, a different business model that makes serving that segment profitable, incumbents’ reluctance to respond, and a credible trajectory of improvement.

Understanding this mechanism matters for strategy. Incumbents must distinguish structural threats from mere better products; startups should seek underserved markets rather than merely out-engineering incumbents. Examples illustrate the distinction: Netflix followed a disruptive path by starting with a less attractive mail-and-subscription model and later streaming; Airbnb began from the bottom and moved up; by contrast, Uber and Tesla transformed industries without fitting Christensen’s pattern. The article offers five diagnostic questions—about customers, trade-offs, business model, incumbents’ incentives, and improvement path—to test for disruption. Accurate use of the concept clarifies strategy: many innovations are transformative without being disruptive, but only some follow the disruption trajectory Christensen described.

"Disruptive" has become synonymous with "innovative," but Clayton Christensen's theory is much more accurate. We look at what disruptive innovation actually is, what cases fit into it, and how to identify it in a business.

Few words have been as successful in the language of innovation as “disruptive.” And few have lost as much precision along the way.

A new technology, a fast-growing startup, or a company that changes the rules of an industry are often given the same label: disruptive innovation. But making a big impact in a market doesn’t automatically make an innovation disruptive.

The theory developed by Clayton Christensen describes a much more concrete phenomenon. A new competitor starts by serving customers ignored by market leaders or people who until then could not even access the product. Its proposition is usually simpler, more accessible or cheaper. At first, it is unattractive to the most profitable customers of established companies. Then it improves. And when it reaches the features demanded by the general market, it can end up displacing those who dominated the sector.

Understanding the mechanism matters. For an established company, it allows you to distinguish a structural threat from a new competitor that simply offers a better product. For a startup, it helps to identify opportunities where large players have little incentive to react.

And for everyone, it serves to stop calling everything that moves disruptive.

What is disruptive innovation and where does the concept come from?

The origin of the theory is in the article Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, published in the Harvard Business Review in 1995 by Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen. Christensen later developed his ideas in The Innovator’s Dilemma, published in 1997.

The question I was trying to answer was fascinating: why do well-managed companies that listen to their customers, invest in innovation, and make seemingly rational decisions end up losing their leadership? Precisely because they make rational decisions.

Established companies tend to focus resources on their most profitable customers. They improve their products, increase their performance, and pursue higher-margin markets. Meanwhile, new competitors may appear with simpler offerings that initially interest those customers little. That’s the space where disruption can start.

The theory distinguishes two possible entry points. Disruption at the bottom of the market occurs when certain customers are “overserved”: they pay for performance, complexity or quality that they do not really need. New market disruption arises when an innovation converts people into customers who until then were not consumers because the existing alternatives were too expensive, complicated or inaccessible.

Christensen, Michael Raynor, and Rory McDonald returned to this distinction in 2015 to correct the overly broad use of the term in the Harvard Business Review landmark article What Is Disruptive Innovation?.

Disruption is also not an intrinsic feature of a technology. It depends on how it enters a market, what customers it serves, and what business model it builds around it.

Disruptive vs. sustained innovation: an important difference

A common confusion arises here. The real counterpoint to disruptive innovation in Christensen’s theory is sustaining innovation, not incremental innovation.

Sustained innovation improves the performance of a product or service for customers that a company already serves. It can be a small incremental improvement. It can also be a huge technological leap.

A new, much more powerful processor, a battery with twice the battery life, or a drug therapy that radically improves treatment outcomes can represent extraordinary advances and remain sustained innovations if they allow for better performance to existing customers.

The Christensen Institute’s explanation of sustained and disruptive innovation sums it up from the logic of the market: incumbents improve their products to satisfy their best customers; disruptors start in less attractive segments or among new consumers and move from there.

At the Bankinter Innovation Foundation, we have already addressed this difference in our analysis of sustainable innovation versus disruptive innovation.

The distinction matters because an innovation can be radical without being disruptive. And it can also start with a relatively modest technology and end up causing real disruption.

Netflix vs. Blockbuster: The Classic Example

Netflix is probably the clearest modern example.

When he started his DVD rental business by mail, his proposal had an obvious disadvantage compared to Blockbuster: you had to wait to receive the film.

For someone who wanted to see the latest release that same night, Blockbuster was clearly superior. Netflix was interesting for another type of consumer, willing to sacrifice immediacy in exchange for convenience, catalog and a different rental model.

Blockbuster had little reason to worry. In 2000 it had a turnover of more than $5 billion and made about $800 million through late penalties, according to the Christensen Institute’s analysis of Netflix and Blockbuster. That same year, Netflix was offered to Blockbuster for $50 million. The deal never happened.

Then came the improvement. Netflix gained scale, developed its subscription model and ended up making the leap to streaming. The product that initially seemed unattractive compared to the video store ended up redefining consumer expectations.

The key to Christensen’s theory is not that Netflix used the internet. It is the trajectory it followed.

Personal computers: creating a market where none existed before

Another classic example allows us to understand the disruption of the new market.

The first personal computers had much lower performance than the large computers used by companies and organizations. To compare them directly would have been absurd.

But they allowed millions of people who would never have bought a mainframe or a minicomputer to have computing power.

They created consumption. As personal computers improved, they were able to solve more and more tasks and occupy spaces previously reserved for much more expensive and complex systems.

This pattern is especially interesting for entrepreneurs: many disruptive opportunities appear when the question stops being “how do I make a product better than the leader?” and becomes “how do I make it possible for someone who cannot consume today to start doing so?”.

Airbnb: A disruption that started from the bottom

Airbnb offers another interesting case. Its early adopters also did not receive an experience equivalent to that of a traditional hotel. Sleeping in an available room or even on a stranger’s sofa did not exactly compete with a hotel suite.

The proposal played on other dimensions: availability, flexibility and price. In addition, it allowed a huge amount of accommodation capacity that already existed but remained outside the hotel industry to be incorporated into the market.

Over time, the platform advanced to higher segments and incorporated entire apartments, premium homes and experiences.

The Clayton Christensen Institute has analyzed Airbnb as a trajectory that starts from an initially unattractive offer for traditional hotel consumers and then moves towards more demanding segments.

Uber: transforming an industry doesn’t always mean being disruptive

Uber helps to understand the exact opposite. Few companies have changed urban mobility so much over the past few decades. However, Christensen, Raynor, and McDonald expressly used Uber as an example of a company that doesn’t fit into the classic theory of disruptive innovation in What Is Disruptive Innovation?.

Why? Because Uber didn’t start out primarily catering to people who were outside the market, nor did it enter with an inferior offering aimed at less profitable taxi customers. It entered directly into the mainstream market by offering many of its customers an experience they perceived as better: mobile request, driver information, automatic payment, and vehicle tracking.

It was an extraordinarily powerful innovation. It also profoundly altered an industry. But that’s not enough to make it a disruptive innovation, according to Christensen. Here’s

one of the great lessons of the theory: impact and disruption are not synonymous.

Tesla: a radical innovation that also did not follow the classic path

Tesla offers another good example.

Its first vehicles did not enter the low-end. They did exactly the opposite.

The Roadster and the first Model S competed in premium segments with high-performance cars and high prices. The company started at the top and then sought to expand the market with more affordable models.

That path contradicts Christensen’s usual trajectory of disruption, which starts from new markets or lower segments and progressively rises.

None of this reduces Tesla’s innovative character. Precisely therein lies the point: a company can change an industry, accelerate a technological transition and become a global benchmark without following the pattern of Disruptive Innovation.

Kodak: Why we should be careful with stories that are too simple

Another very common story also deserves review: Kodak saw digital photography arrive, ignored it and disappeared.

The reality is much more interesting. Digital photography did end up making the photographic film business practically obsolete. But Kodak did not remain immobile in the face of this technology.

The company had detected the arrival of digital imaging and made significant investments to develop capabilities in this field. The problem was deeper: how to transfer the new technology to a business model capable of replacing the economics of film, development and photographic printing.

Kodak’s story is thus much more useful: it shows that detecting a new technology and investing in it does not guarantee surviving a market change either.

Are fintechs and neobanks disruptive?

The financial sector shows how easy it is to abuse the label.

A fintech is not disruptive simply because it is digital. Nor is a neobank disruptive because it operates from an application.

Some financial innovations can follow a disruptive trajectory when they allow them to offer services to customers who were outside the system or to segments that traditional banks cannot serve profitably. Other fintechs offer a better experience to the same customers who were already using financial services. In that case, we would be closer to sustained innovation.

The Christensen Institute itself has applied this distinction to the financial market. Its report Banking on Disruption analyzes how certain new lenders can present disruptive potential, while other models compete mainly by improving the experience of customers already served.

This nuance is especially useful now that artificial intelligence, embedded finance, blockchain and new payment infrastructures are multiplying the possible models.

The relevant question remains the same: who was unable to access the solution before and what does the new economic model change?

A Spanish case: Mondo and the danger of using “disruptive” too quickly

At the Foundation we have analysed the case of Mondo, an insurtech that has innovated in a mature sector such as travel insurance. Its founders detected significant frictions in the contracting and management of this type of insurance and built a simpler, more digital and customer-centric experience.

It is a very interesting story of business innovation.

However, to affirm that Mondo constitutes a disruptive innovation in Christensen’s strict sense, we would also need to demonstrate that it began serving non-consumers or overserved segments that are unattractive to traditional insurers and that from there it is advancing to the main market.

The available information allows us to speak clearly about technological innovation, business model and customer experience. It is more difficult to demonstrate the complete trajectory of disruption.

This exercise shows why it is worth using the concept accurately.

How to identify a disruptive innovation: five questions

Before qualifying an innovation as disruptive, these five questions help to check whether it really follows the pattern:

  1. Do you start with non-consumers or overserved customers? A disruption needs an entry point that is unattractive to current leaders.
  2. Does the initial proposition sacrifice traditional capabilities for another advantage? It can offer lower performance based on common metrics and gain in simplicity, accessibility, convenience, or price.
  3. Is there a different business model that allows you to profitably serve that segment? Technology alone rarely explains disruption.
  4. Do incumbents have economic reasons to ignore it? If the new competitor attacks its best customers and higher margins from the get-go, they will likely react. If it serves a small or unprofitable market, they may leave it room to grow.
  5. Can it improve until it reaches the main market? Disruption is a process. The new entrant needs a credible trajectory that allows them to increase performance without losing the advantages that made their initial proposal attractive.

The combination of these questions is much more useful than simply asking whether a technology is “revolutionary”.

How to apply disruptive innovation to a company

Seeking disruption by starting with technology often leads to the wrong place.

The first step is to look for non-consumption, excess features and poorly solved problems.

Who can’t use a product today because of its price? Which customers pay for features they hardly need? What process requires specialized knowledge that could be simplified? Which service is only profitable for the company when the customer is a certain size? Opportunities arise.

Then comes the business model. A disruptive innovation needs to be able to operate economically where the incumbent has difficulty doing so. Reducing costs, simplifying processes, using new channels, turning assets into platforms, or automating tasks can change that equation.

This vision connects with the analysis of the Foundation’s Future Trends Forum on disruptive business models. Javier Creus, founder of Ideas for Change, explains how new combinations between the existing and the emerging can generate much more value or do so with much less effort, while startups function as a large distributed laboratory to test these combinations.

For consolidated companies, an additional challenge appears. A possible disruptive innovation may initially have margins, customers and metrics that are incompatible with the core business.

Christensen’s literature therefore proposes the creation of autonomous units, capable of developing a different model without being forced to meet the same expectations as the existing business from day one.

There is also room for acquisition, collaboration, or spin-off strategies depending on the circumstances. The Christensen Institute has recently re-emphasized an important idea: disruption is not in itself a strategy. It is a theory that helps to understand how the market may react to a certain strategy.

Innovating a lot does not always mean being disruptive

This is perhaps the most useful conclusion.

Netflix can follow a disruptive trajectory. Uber can radically transform an industry without fitting into the theory. Tesla can accelerate a technological revolution by entering from the high-end. A fintech can be disruptive or simply offer a much better service.

The label matters less than understanding the mechanism.

Christensen’s theory remains valuable precisely because it forces us to ask specific questions: who is underserved, which customers are unattractive to leaders, what new economic model allows us to serve them, and whether that proposition can improve to conquer the mainstream market.

When those pieces fit together, there can be disruption underway. When they don’t, we probably still have an innovation. And that can be transformative enough.